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1 Introduction: why insurance?
A growing body of evidence indicates that climate
change is set to increase the frequency and intensity
of natural hazards (IPCC 2007). A recent United
Nations report (2007) asserts that global hydro-
meteorological hazards, such as droughts, floods and
hurricanes, have increased by 87 per cent over the
last 20 years. Those most affected by this trend are
the world’s poor. Poor people in developing
countries are the most exposed to natural hazards, as
in most cases they have to manage weather risks by
their own means and have limited or no access to
insurance and financial services to help them recover
from crises (Syroka and Wilcox 2006).
In sub-Saharan Africa about 140 million people live
with the constant threat of droughts or floods.
Prevailing uncertainty and the absence of financial
safety nets makes it difficult for poor farmers to
make higher-risk, higher-return investments. Then,
when the rains fail, vulnerable households act fast.
Immediate response strategies include selling non-
productive assets or migration of family members.
However, if the situation does not improve, they are
forced to use more costly coping strategies, like
removing children from school, reducing food
consumption and health expenditures, and selling
productive assets, such as farming tools and livestock
(Barnett et al. 2006; Hess et al. 2006).
By the time humanitarian aid reaches the poor, the
majority have already lost key assets and livelihoods,
and therefore their ability to benefit from better
weather the following year (WFP 2006). According
to the World Bank and the World Food Programme
(WFP) this response ‘delay’ under an ex post
emergency model, accounts for large numbers of
new destitute people after a climate-related disaster.
After losing their productive assets, these newly
poor are often trapped in a state of dependency on
external aid for many years (Hess et al. 2006; Morris
2005), and risk moving from temporary poverty to
being chronically poor.
In this scenario, humanitarian assumptions have
started to be questioned: are our response
mechanisms working or will the reinforcement of
old practices become a risk for the poor? Do we
need to find a more effective and sustainable way to
approach weather risk and humanitarian assistance?
In response to these questions, innovative models are
now being considered and tested (Pelling 2007).
This article looks at weather insurance schemes
recently piloted at the micro- and macro-levels, and
assesses their potential as tools for social protection. It
highlights the challenges of and differences between
the two approaches, and looks at the opportunities
for improved targeting and local participation.
Key findings are that weather-based microinsurance
ultimately targets relatively better off farmers and is
not an appropriate tool for broad social protection
targeting all poor groups. Macroinsurance policies in
support of existing social protection programmes
appear to have more potential in reaching the most
vulnerable. By providing timely and predictable aid
after a severe drought, disaster insurance can have an
important role in saving the livelihoods of transiently
food-insecure people.1
2 Is traditional crop insurance a viable option?
In developed countries, traditional multi-peril crop
insurance is widely used and heavily subsidised by the
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government. However, many have questioned the
financial viability of such schemes (Skees et al. 1999),
considering not only the high monitoring and
administrative costs, but also the risk of adverse
selection and moral hazard; since once insured,
farmers often lose the incentive to minimise their
loss by investing in risk reduction. Therefore,
traditional crop insurance has been seen as a poor
model for export, particularly for developing
countries, most of which are under serious fiscal
constraints and have smallholder economies highly
exposed to the risk of simultaneous losses from a
single event (Morduch 2001).
Recently, due to the introduction of a new approach
to crop insurance with index-based products, an
opportunity for improving vulnerable communities’
resilience has arisen: through close integration of
disaster risk reduction with risk transfer tools there is
a chance to create a viable insurance market in
developing countries and to provide a mechanism for
financing safety net and disaster relief programmes in
countries where climate variability constitutes a
major risk (Pelling 2007; Barnett et al. 2006).
3 Index-based risk transfer products
Index-based insurance is still a relatively new tool and
more research is necessary to fully comprehend its
potential and limitations. Unlike traditional insurance,
contracts are written on a physical trigger (i.e. rainfall
measurements at a local weather station) that acts
as a proxy for crop losses a farmer experiences in his
field, rather than using his actual losses to determine
a claim. Since no field inspections are required, there
is a drastic reduction of transaction costs and claims
can be paid promptly. Moreover, as the index is based
on objectively measurable data, there are few
asymmetric information problems and the index can
be transferred directly to international financial
markets (Morris 2005; Mechler et al. 2006; Davies et
al., this IDS Bulletin).
The drawback is that significant investments in the
start-up phase are necessary to develop these
schemes, and international reinsurance companies may
be reluctant to cover these costs. Therefore, some aid
agencies and governmental organisations have started
piloting these schemes to explore their potential.
Index-based schemes can be implemented at micro-
or macro-level. The micro-model offers protection
to weather risks that have direct impact on a
farmer’s agricultural production. The macro-model
focuses on risk at an aggregate level and when crop
production is affected at a regional, national or
multi-country level. Usually, these initiatives aim to
meet different policy objectives and target different
segments of the rural population with different risk
profiles than the micro-models. Both models pose
different challenges with regard to local participation
and targeting.
4 A micro approach to index-based insurance
To date, only a few micro-level policies have been
implemented.2 These models require a big initial
investment for the start-up phase, primarily to collect
the necessary data to establish the index, but can
become self-sustainable when the project scales up
and a big pool of insured people (generally more than
10,000) is created.3 These micro policies can be sold
to individual farmers or to groups, like a cooperative
or an entire village, and can also offer protection for
localised weather risks (Mechler et al. 2006).
As highlighted at the 2007 ProVention Forum, major
challenges to this approach are the threat that large
covariant losses can pose to the financial stability of
insurers and the prevailing absence of an institutional
architecture to pull risk transfer and risk reduction
together (Pelling 2007). One of the key lessons
learnt to date is that investment in microinsurance
without complementary investment in financial
intermediaries and effective marketing channels and
supply chains, where linkages can be made, will limit
the take-up and scalability of such initiatives
(UN DESA 2007).
In fact, as the Malawi experience highlights (see
Box 1), in order for this insurance to work, other risks
faced by farmers (such as access to market and to
credit) need to be addressed. Moreover, to date, the
most financially sustainable examples of weather
microinsurance have been where insurance is offered
as part of a broader portfolio of policies (as done in
the BASIX scheme). Technical issues can represent
another limitation. Since this type of insurance has to
capture local weather events on a farmer’s field, a
large number of weather stations are necessary.
These characteristics of micro policies pose
significant challenges for the targeting of areas and
communities where services like market, insurance
providers and diffused weather stations are absent
and, for different reasons, difficult to develop.
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4.1 Targeting and participation
In principle, this model is able to offer protection to
different categories of the poor (not only farmers
but also landless and pastoralist communities),
making it potentially more relevant than traditional
crop insurance. The index-based approach at the
micro-level also suggests a higher degree of
transparency and can limit corruption. A key requisite
for transparency and accountability of these schemes,
however, is a community’s active involvement in
managing the insurance, as it will directly determine
the levels of responsibility the community is willing
to assume for the success or failure of the scheme
(Pierro and Desai 2007).
However, a major challenge is the affordability of
commercial insurance for the poor (Pelling 2007).
Experience from Malawi and India suggests that
micro weather insurance may not be an appropriate
solution for very poor rural communities and for the
poorest parts of the population. In fact, staff from
World Bank involved in developing such schemes
point out that these products focus on increasing
the productivity and profitability of less poor farmers,
which is why they are often bundled with credit and
input supplies.5
Basis risk (that occurs when the trigger is
insufficiently correlated with the losses and no
payout is given even though losses occurred),
combined with ‘perceived’ basis risk can make this
tool unsuitable for the poorest. People for which the
payment of a premium can already be a heavy
burden, could lose any incentive after experiencing a
loss that is not covered by the policy (for instance
crop loss due to pest attack). They could perceive the
insurance as a fraud and decide not to renew the
policy for the future. Only people with some assets
to protect and certain levels of financial liquidity will
be able and willing to pay the premium on a regular
basis. These limitations are likely to determine
difficulties in targeting subsistence farmers who face
multiple risks, and make this tool inappropriate for
social protection.
There is still a lack of information on what is
necessary for the poor to fully benefit from this tool.
According to Christian Aid programme staff for
instance, the presence of empowered communities
and the absence of conflict are crucial conditions
(Pierro and Desai 2007). Additional factors are an
affordable premium, the simplicity of the scheme
and broad coverage. However, local culture could
strongly interfere with the viability of these schemes
and the willingness of people to pay for the
premium: lack of trust in top-down interventions and
a lack of incentives, resources and energy can
present significant barriers.
Understanding the poor’s expectations of benefits
from the insurance, and building their trust through
improved transparency of the scheme will be crucial
for its success. Certainly, more research and pilot
studies are necessary to explore how this tool can
affect power relations within a village, including the
effects it may have on people unable to join the
scheme and on gender relations within a household.6
5 A macro approach to index-based insurance
A different approach to index-based insurance is
currently being piloted at the macro-level, through
national and multi-country policies. These schemes
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Box 1 NASFAM in Malawi
Small-scale peanut farmers in Malawi are generally unable to buy high-quality seeds that are more
resistant to drought on a regular basis. In 2005, to make them more creditworthy, NASFAM (a
farmers’ association) with technical assistance from the World Bank and Opportunity International,
designed a pilot index-based insurance scheme. Multiple underwriters were necessary since no single
underwriter was willing to take the risk alone, given the huge payout in the event of a drought. In the
first season, 892 farmers bought the insurance; they were small farmers with an average of one acre
of land (Opportunity International 2005).
However, farmers experienced a low harvest due to the seed quality they received. The seeds provided
by NASFAM were too old, producing poor yields and resulting in an inability by participating farmers
to repay their loans.4 This experience shows that microinsurance can be a tool in disaster mitigation
only if the coupled services are functioning well. 
appear to be suitable for low-probability, high-
consequence weather risks.
The first National Disaster Insurance was
implemented in Ethiopia in 2006 while the first
Multi-country Disaster Insurance was implemented in
the Caribbean in 2007. In these policies, the contract
is written between governments, donors and a
reinsurance company. This policy would guarantee
national governments a reliable payout as soon as an
insured disaster strikes. The World Bank, WFP and
Department for International Development (DFID)
have been involved in its promotion and pilot,
helping national stakeholders to build capacity that
would enable them to link with international
financial markets.
Macroinsurance is easier to implement than
microinsurance, since it involves only few insured
entities (governments and development agencies),
which can deal with basis risk more easily than
individual farmers can. Covering only severe weather
events, it does not require as large a number of
weather stations to be implemented successfully as
microinsurance (only about 26 weather stations were
sufficient to cover the whole of Ethiopia).
Moreover, disaster insurance, seen as a national
adaptive mechanism to climate change, could offer
the basis for a rights-based approach to climate
change. For instance, models could be developed
where subsidies to the insurance’s premium would
be provided by high carbon-producing countries as
part of compensatory schemes for adaptation in
countries affected by climate change; managed
through the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change’s (UNFCCC) Adaptation Fund.
During the 2007 ProVention Forum, some key
challenges have been identified for this macro
approach: financial sustainability of insurance products,
creating incentives for risk reduction, and difficulty in
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Table 1 Some advantages and challenges of disaster insurance
Advantages of disaster insurance Challenges and limitations of disaster insurance
z It can increase governments’ self-determination z Payment of premium can be unsustainable for
and ownership governments and donors
z It could save livelihoods, therefore it can be more z Difficulty of engagement with civil society, as 
financially sustainable than traditional humanitarian already experienced by the implementation of the 
aid, which focuses on saving lives PSNP
z By guaranteeing a predictable and reliable payout z Risk of conflict with existing response capacities, 
in case of disaster, it will allow for longer-term where they can overlap with new programmes 
planning in development complementing the insurance (see possible conflict 
z It can diminish the negative effect external relief between Disaster Prevention and Preparedness 
and reconstruction interventions often have in Committee (DPPC) and Contingency Plan in Ethiopia)7
eroding local markets and exacerbating social z It needs to be part of a broader contingency plan, 
inequalities (Pelling 2007) since it can only cover catastrophic risk (not small-scale 
z It seems transferable to other countries with disasters)
available historical and up-to-date weather data.  z It is not capable of addressing all types of
The World Bank is also exploring the opportunity humanitarian crisis (e.g. conflicts). Therefore, as a social 
for using Satellite Imaging protection tool, it needs to be part of a broader set of
z It will create or reinforce the idea that the state emergency response mechanisms (Barnett et al. 2006)
has responsibilities to ensure its citizens’ safety and z It can replace losses but cannot be a substitute for
protection of their livelihoods (Pelling 2007) job creation, for market access, or education that did 
z It can guarantee greater dignity for the not exist in the first place
beneficiaries than aid appeals (Syroka and Wilcox 2006) z Complexity of cost-benefit analysis
z If weather data collected are openly shared, they 
can be valuable for any disaster risk reduction 
programme
z It could offer a basis for a rights-based approach 
to climate change
finding a balance of public–private roles. Additionally,
there is the technical challenge of generating reliable
historical and updated meteorological data while
developing effective climate change scenarios to use
as the basis for estimating future risk (Table 1).
The aim of currently tested macro-level schemes,
such as the Ethiopia pilot, are to explore whether it
is feasible to use market tools to finance drought
risk, and to prove that accurate indicators can be
developed to trigger drought assistance. While in
that respect the Ethiopia pilot appears to have been
successful, key challenges for its implementation
remain targeting and participation.
5.1 Targeting and participation
A study carried out on the Ethiopia Productive
Safety Net Programme (PSNP) shows that overall,
the programme reaches the poor and food-insecure
but that the level of transparency and accountability
varied greatly across the region. Several problems
have been highlighted, for instance bad timing of
public work in some areas, overlapping of
membership of the targeting and appeals bodies and
some gender issues (Sharp et al. 2006). According to
Christian Aid staff, the top-down approach of these
national programmes is creating conflict with local
civil society. Local non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) are not involved in the identification and
planning of public work projects and the large scale
of these projects often undermines the viabilities of
smaller local projects.8
For the disaster insurance scheme, the WFP and the
Government of Ethiopia’s Food Security Bureau
designed an Implementation Rulebook, modelled on
and complementary to the PSNP, describing targeting
guidelines for cash-for-work or food-for-work projects
(Hess et al. 2006, WFP 2006). The combination of
community-based and administrative targeting systems
laid out in the rulebook should help to ensure a certain
degree of community participation and ownership.
However, to date there is no information about
participation levels and targeting outcomes in the
Ethiopia insurance scheme as it has only been piloted
once and no payout has occurred to date.
From the Ethiopia pilot, it emerges that for drought
insurance to be affordable, can only cover
catastrophic droughts and needs to be coordinated
with a safety net programme (like the PSNP),
targeting people exposed also to chronic risk. But
drought insurance can enhance and increase the
sustainability of social protection systems that aim to
reach the poorest during emergencies. More
research is required to better understand the
different opportunities for disaster insurance in
covering other weather risks besides droughts and in
targeting people with different levels of vulnerability.
6 Conclusions
Index-based weather insurance is still at a pilot stage
and many questions remain unanswered. More
research and comparison among different projects is
required to understand the feasibility of this approach,
IDS Bulletin Volume 39  Number 4  September 2008 127
Drought insurance in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, the emergency system recently underwent a major reform. Starting in 2005, the
government introduced the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), a predictable and increasingly
cash-based model targeting the chronically food-insecure. However, this partial reform of the
emergency system did not appear to be financially sustainable, since it did not include an effective
mechanism to protect livelihoods of the transiently food-insecure people. They remained at risk of
losing their assets during future crises, risking an unsustainable growth of the chronically food-
insecure community and therefore the PSNP. 
Then in 2006, the first National Disaster Insurance was piloted by the WFP and AXA Re. in Ethiopia,
targeting the transiently food-insecure community (Hess et al. 2006). While the pilot provides only a
small amount of contingency funding, covering 310,000 beneficiaries with a maximum payout of
$7.1 million, the model is calibrated to potentially assist 17 million Ethiopian farmers who risk
destitution as a consequence of a severe drought (Syroka and Wilcox 2006). The insurance will be part
of an Early Livelihood Protection Facility, combining a Contingency Fund (up to $50 million) for very
mild droughts, an additional Contingency Grant (up to $40 million) for mild droughts and additional
Disaster Insurance provision (up to $60 million) for severe droughts (Hess et al. 2006).
Notes
1 Transiently food-insecure people can be defined
as people who, even though normally food-
secure, are subject to acute but temporary food
shortages due to climatic or other sudden shock.
2 For example the BASIX pilot in India (see
www.basixindia.com) and NASFAM’s scheme in
Malawi (Box 1).
3 Personal communication with Opportunity
International’s staff, March 2007.
its financial sustainability and the different options for
its implementation. What can be said with some
clarity, however, is that local participation at every stage
of an insurance programme’s design, implementation
and monitoring remains a key challenge and yet is
crucial to its success. To build on existing experience
and further explore the potential of weather insurance,
stakeholders at all levels need to get involved.
Civil society and the private sector must use their
skills, expertise and institutional structures to work
alongside governments. Risk transfer programmes
need to be piloted and tested in their ability to
become an integral component of countries’ broader
strategies to reduce the devastating consequences of
natural disasters.
From the evidence reviewed for this article, as tools
for social protection, macroinsurance models have
more potential than microinsurance schemes.
Therefore, the following final conclusions focus on
what is needed to advance our understanding of the
potential role of national and regional disaster
insurance schemes for disaster risk reduction and
climate change adaptation.
1 More research is required to critically analyse
current experience and develop solid feasibility
studies.
(a) Which disasters can be covered by index-based
insurance?9
(b) What are the first steps in developing
appropriate models and who should bear the high
cost of start-up phases?
(c) What are the qualitative impacts of this
model? How can it impact on the protection of
livelihood? How does it impact on women’s
access to public space and on poor people’s access
to markets and social services?
(d) In the Ethiopia pilot, the insurance is part of an
Early Livelihood Protection Facility. Is this complex
structure transferable to other pilots? What are
other options?
(e) In Ethiopia and in the Caribbean, premiums for
pilot Disaster Insurance are paid by governments
and donors. Who can be expected to pay for the
premium in the long term? Is such an annual
disbursement ($5 million has been estimated by
the World Bank as the necessary annual premium
to cover 1.5 million people in Ethiopia from severe
droughts) a feasible approach to emergency
management?
(f) Can a rights-based approach to Disaster
Insurance be developed at an international level?
What are the options for this in the context of
climate change adaptation and the current
UNFCCC negotiations?
2 Participation issues need to be addressed and
engagement with civil society must be improved.
(a) What is the present experience with
transparency and local participation in disaster
insurance? How can it be documented more
systematically and built on more effectively?
(b) Given the problems with the PSNP in Ethiopia
highlighted by Christian Aid staff, how can
communities and civil society become more
involved?
(c) There is a need to understand power relations
at the local level in order to have real
participation and in order to avoid reinforcing
social inequalities. These questions need to be
considered: Who are the stakeholders involved in
the process? Which are the power relations
present among them? Has voice been given to all
stakeholders involved?
3 The Ethiopia pilot showed that drought insurance
targets transiently food-insecure people and can
therefore protect the PSNP.
(a) Is that the case also with other disaster
insurance? Or can this tool in other contexts
directly target the most vulnerable parts of the
population?
(b) How was the targeting process carried out in
present experiences? How has it been monitored?
(c) What was the level of participation in the
targeting process?
(d) Whose risks and which risks are really being
transferred?
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4 World Bank website: www.worldbank.org
5 Personal communication with Joanna Syroka,
World Bank, 17 August 2007.
6 The ProVention Consortium has recently started a
joint evaluation of ten microinsurance pilot
schemes in Asia. The study focuses on financial
viability, on the schemes’ contribution to risk
reduction and on the impact on insurers’
households. It will certainly give an important
contribution towards a better understanding of
microinsurance’s ability to reduce risks for people
with different level of vulnerability.
7 UN OCHA (2007) Evaluation of the Response to the
2002–03 Emergency in Ethiopia.
8 Personal communication with Christian Aid’s
Ethiopia country manager, 18 July 2007.
9 For instance the Commodity Risk Management
Group is testing flood index insurance in Vietnam,
based on satellite imaging.
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